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ASSESSING LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE RUSSIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND ARTICLE 55(3)*
PETER KRUG*"
I. Introduction
The Constitution of the Russian Federation' includes a catalog of individual
rights2 and states explicitly that those rights rank in the top layer of the legal
hierarchy3 and operate with direct effect, enforceable through recourse to
judicial bodies.4 In according such elevated status to fundamental rights, the
authors of the constitution also anticipated the challenge confronting the
courts in reconciling the exercise of those rights with governmental
restrictions that advance competing interests. Their vehicle for accomplishing
this is set forth in Article 55.3, which states in full: "Human and civil rights
and freedoms may be restricted by federal law only to the extent necessary for
upholding the foundations of the constitutional system, morality, or the health
* This Essay is based on a paper presented at the annual conference of the American
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November 24,
2002. It includes analysis of decisions of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court through
the end of April 2003. I am very grateful to William Burnham for his thoughtful comments.
** Herman G. Kaiser Foundation Chair in International Law and Professor of Law,
University of Oklahoma College of Law. J.D., 1985, University of Wisconsin School of Law;
Ph.D., 1979, B.A., 1967, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. KONSTITUTSIA RF [KONST. RF] [Constitution] (1993), translated in CONSTrrUTION
OF THE RussiAN FEDERATION app. (Vladimir V. Belyakov & Walter J. Raymond eds., 1994).
2. The civil, economic, political, and social rights are enumerated in Chapter I (Articles
17-64) of the constitution, which is entitled "Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms." Id. arts.
17-64, app. at 21-36.
3. Article 15.1 of the constitution states in full:
The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall be the supreme law and shall be
in force throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. No laws or other
legislative acts passed in the Russian Federation shall contravene the Constitution
of the Russian Federation.
Id. art. 15.1, app. at 20.
4. Article 18 of the constitution states in full:
Human and civil rights and freedoms shall be instituted directly. They shall
determine the purpose, content and application of the laws, the work of legislative
and executive authority and local self-government and shall be guaranteed by the
justice system.
Id. art. 18, app. at 22.
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rights and lawful interests of other persons or for ensuring the defense of the
country and state security."5
Article 55.3 is an express statement of "broad proportionality"
methodology, 6 containing elements similar to those found in Articles 8-11 of
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),7 which have received
extensive application in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.8
In addition, broad proportionality methodology has been a staple in the
jurisprudence of a number of courts, including the European Court of Justice,
the German Federal Constitutional Court, and the United States Supreme
Court, but without an explicit textual basis.9
As indicated by the textual elements of Article 55.3, and applied by foreign
courts, a "broad proportionality" approach requires a reviewing court to make
a series of determinations, including not only an ends-means test of necessity
and excessive impact ("strict proportionality"), but also threshold
determinations as to whether a governmental act interferes with (or
"implicates") the exercise of constitutional rights, whether the act seeks to
advance an interest deemed suitable (or "legitimate") for an interference with
such rights, and whether it indeed advances that interest.10
5. Id. art. 55.3, app. at 33.
6. Article 55.3 represents a departure from Soviet-era constitutions. For example, Article
39.2 of the 1977 U.S.S.R. Constitution also set forth the proposition that individual
constitutional rights are not absolute, stating that: "Enjoyment by citizens of their rights and
freedoms must not be to the detriment of the interests of society or the state, or infringe the
rights of other citizens." CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS art. 39, 2 (1977). However, unlike Article 55.3, Article 39.2 was silent
regarding limits on the exercise of state authority.
7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, arts. 8-11, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230-32. The second paragraph of ECHR Article 10,
regarding freedom of expression, for example, states in full:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Id. art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230-32.
8. Marc-Andrd Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the European
Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
125-46 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
9. See Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Guarantees, Characterization and the Concept of
Proportionality, 21 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 1, 4, 45 (1997).
10. This description draws upon a number of sources on proportionality, including:
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
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In Russia, the judicial body primarily responsible for application of Article
55.3 is the Russian Federation Constitutional Court (the Court). The Court,
which was established in 1991, was not operating at the time of the
constitution's adoption and entry into force in December 1993." Following
the enactment of a new governing statute in July 1994,12 the Court resumed
activity and issued its first decisions construing and applying the new
constitution in 1995.13 Under Article 125.4 of the constitution, the Court is
competent to review generally applicable parliamentary laws for their
constitutionality when such enactments are the targets of individual
complaints or the subject of referrals from other courts.' 4 The Court is not
competent to entertain individual complaints claiming the unconstitutionality
of other governmental acts, including judicial decisions. 5
My goal in this Essay is to examine the Court's treatment of certain key
questions that have arisen in its construction and application of the broad
proportionality methodology set forth in Article 55.3. In Part I, I will identify
GERMANY 46 (2d ed. 1997); RAYMOND YOUNGS, SOURCEBOOK ON GERMAN LAW 108-09 (2d
ed. 2002); Grdinne de Bdrca, The Principle of Proportionality and Its Application in EC Law,
in 13 YEARBOOK OFEUROPEAN LAW 1993, at 105, 105-14 (A. Barav & D.A. Wyatt eds., 1994);
Eissen, supra note 8; Kirk, supra note 9; Christoph Engel, The Constitutional Court -
Applying the Proportionality Principle - as a Subsidiary Authority for the Assessment of
Political Outcomes 1, 2-10 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/pdfdat/2001_10.pdf
(regarding the German Federal Constitutional Court).
11. President Yeltsin's Edict of October 7, 1993 suspended the Court's activity. Robert
Sharlet, Russia's Second Constitutional Court: Politics, Law, and Stability, in RUSSIA IN THE
NEW CENTURY: STABILITY OR DISORDER? 59,61 (Victoria E. Bonnell & George W. Breslauer
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sharlet, Constitutional Court].
12. On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1994, No.
13, Item 1447, translated in STATUTES & DECISIONS, July-Aug. 1995, at 8-56.
13. For a summary of the Court's history, see Sharlet, Constitutional Court, supra note 11,
at 59-61.
14. KONST. RF art. 125.4 (1993), translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, supra note 1, app. at 69.
15. The specialized Court has limited competence to consider certain constitutional
questions. Article 125.4 explicitly limits the Court's competence with regard to individual
complaints or judicial referrals to review of one form of governmental act: the zakon ("statute"),
which is a generally applicable act of the Federal Assembly (the Russian Federation's legislative
branch), signed by the President. Id. Therefore, other forms of governmental action, whether
generally applicable acts, such as presidential edicts, or non-normative acts, such as judicial
decisions, are not subject to the Court's review via the individual complaint or court referral
process. For discussion of the jurisdictional issues in Article 125, see GENNADY M. DANILENKO
& WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 71-73 (1999),
and Peter Krug, Departure from the Centralized Model: The Russian Supreme Court and
Constitutional Control of Legislation, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 725,743-45 (1997) [hereinafter Krug,
Centralized Model].
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those questions and consider the Court's treatment of them. Part Ill will
consider the possible implications of the Court's growing case law in this area
on Russian governance.
II. Case Law
Application of Article 55.3 has become a dynamic element in the Russian
Federation Constitutional Court's jurisprudence in the area of individual
fundamental rights protection. My findings are based on a review of both the
dozens of decrees [postanovleniia] and determinations [opredeleniia]6 in
which Article 55.3 has at least been mentioned since the Second
Constitutional Court began its work in 1995, and the forty-five decrees which
have served as a basis for the Court's decisions as to the constitutionality of
normative acts.17 The Court's Article 55.3 case law has ranged across both a
broad spectrum of normative acts - including criminal procedure, bankrupt-
cy, and election laws - and asserted constitutional rights, such as access to
the courts, property, freedom of contract, and protections for detainees and
criminal defendants.
As a general matter, the Court's case law reflects a steady growth in its
apparent comfort level in addressing Article 55.3 questions, including the
articulation of certain basic principles and methodologies."8 As part of this
16. For translations and explanations of the different forms of the Court's decisionmaking,
see Donald D. Barry, Decision-Making and Dissent in the Russian Federation Constitutional
Court, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW IN RuSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE (Roger Clark
et al. eds., 2001) (Law in E. Eur., Series No. 49, 2001). Postanovleniia are final decisions of
the Court concerning the substantive aspects of an admissible complaint or inquiry.
Opredeleniia are other types of decisions made by the Court, including those regarding
inadmissibility, procedural aspects of a case (such as postponement or termination), and
clarifications of earlier Court decisions. For a detailed discussion, see Sarah J. Reynolds,
Editor's Introduction, STATUTES & DECISIONS, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 5-10.
17. For reasons similar to those set forth by Professor Barry, see supra note 16, at 7, I will
focus on decrees in this Essay. In conducting this review of the Court's decisions, I have
benefitted greatly from the extremely helpful work of Ger P. van den Berg's summary of Court
decisions, Ger P. van den Berg, Constitution of the Russian Federation Annotated with
Summaries ofRulings and Other Decisions of Constitutional (Charter) Courts: 1990-2001, 27
REV. OF CENT. & E. EUR. L. 175 (2002), Sarah Reynolds's translations and coordination of
translations in Statutes and Decisions, and Gennady Danilenko and William Burnham,
DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 15. Among other things, the information and English
translations in these works have provided very helpful backup for my translation of a number
of the Court's decrees and determinations.
18. See discussion infra Parts II.A-II.D. The first decision of the Second Constitutional
Court to cite Article 55.3 was the Court's third decree, dated April 25, 1995, in a case involving
an asserted right to housing under Article 40.1 of the constitution and invalidity of a provision
of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Housing Code. Decree 3-P,
680 [Vol. 56:677
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evolution, a number of the Court's decisions include lively debates among the
judges, reflected in separate opinions as well as the decrees themselves. 9 The
Court's members most often participating in these debates have been Judges
Kononov and Vitruk,20 whose separate opinions often reflect quite disparate
views on the scope and application of Article 55.3.
A reading of these cases presents an overall impression that the judges have
made considerable effort to present balanced determinations regarding
challenged legislative provisions. While it is difficult to provide precise
numbers, in the cases where the Court has applied Article 55.3 directly as a
basis for decision, roughly 50-60% of the challenged provisions have been
found invalid.2 On a number of occasions, the Court has examined multiple
statutory provisions in individual decrees, finding that some comply with
Article 55.3 and that others do not.22
The Court's Article 55.3 jurisprudence reflects the judges' efforts to
address certain problems that arise generally in fashioning broad
proportionality methodologies, and in applying the particular text of Article
55.3. In sections Il.A-lI.D, I will discuss the Court's treatment of four of these
questions. The first concerns the scope of constitutional rights: when will
governmental acts be deemed interferences with those rights, triggering the
application of Article 55.3? The second addresses the question of which
forms of governmental action may interfere with the exercise of constitutional
rights. Next, in specific cases, which governmental acts advance the
enumerated legitimate interests in Article 55.3? Finally, what does the word
"necessary" add to the assessment of constitutional validity?
II.A.
The threshold question in broad proportionality analysis is whether a
particular governmental act somehow interferes with, or implicates, the
exercise of a constitutional right. The Court's decrees have been extremely
Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva RF [Sobr. Zakonod. RF][Constitutional Court], 1995, No. 18, Item
1708.
19. For a detailed study of dissenting opinions in the Court's practice, see Barry, supra note
16, at 9-17.
20. Professor Barry has identified Judge Kononov as one of the frequent dissenters on the
Court and Judge Vitruk as the "foremost dissenter." Id. at 11, 14.
21. Providing precise numbers is challenging for a number of reasons, including the fact
that in many decisions the Court has cited Article 55.3, but it is not clear that it has been a
consciously applied basis for decision.
22. See, for example, Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 32, Item 3412, in which
the Court examined four provisions of the Russian Federation Law "On Executorial
Proceedings" and found two valid and two invalid.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:677
liberal in addressing this question, without exception treating this requirement
as having been satisfied.23 This leads one to infer that the Court treats this
requirement as a condition for admissibility. 4 Thus, once a complaint is
deemed admissible, the question of whether an interference exists already has
been decided. At the same time, however, the Court's decrees at times include
detailed statements setting forth the Court's reasoning. For example, in its
Decree of April 4, 1996, striking down a City of Moscow residency
registration fee, the Court explained that governmental monetary exactions
always implicate the right of freedom of movement guaranteed under Article
27.1 of the constitution and property rights protected under Article 35.25 In a
later decree, the Court extended this reasoning to a business enterprise's
entrepreneurial rights guaranteed under Article 34.26 As another example, the
Court has subjected certain aspects of bankruptcy law, such as provisions
granting special rights to creditors, to broad proportionality analysis on the
23. In the Court's decrees, I have found only one published statement that rejected a
Chapter I interference claim: Judge Vitruk's separate opinion in the Court's Chernobyl Victims
decree, in which he argued that the legislative act in question - the law on compensation to
victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe - did not place restrictions on rights to compensation,
as claimed by the complainants. Decree 18-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 50, Item 5711,
at 10,109.
24. Under Article 97.1 of the Court's statute, an individual's complaint shall be admissible
if "the law affects the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens." On the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1994, No. 13, Item 1447, translated in
STATUTES & DECISIONS, supra note 12, at 50. For examples of inadmissibility determinations
on these grounds, see Determination 199-0, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 48, Item 4550, at
10,025, which noted that rejection of an individual's application to be a Justice of the Peace
does not implicate constitutional rights, and the Court's un-numbered Determination of
December 21, 2000, regarding the complaint of N.A. Shagunova, in KONSTrruTSIONNYI SUD
RossiisKoI FEDERATSII: POSTANOVLENIIA, OPREDELENIA 2000, at 575 (2001), which stated that
dismissal of a judge from her duties does not implicate constitutional rights.
25. Decree 9-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 16, Item 1909, at 4201,4203. For a detailed
discussion, see N.S. Krylova, Judicial Constitutional Control and Legal Regulation of Tax
Relations in the Russian Federation andAbroad, 3 SUDEBNIK 531,543-45 (1998). Article 27.1
states in full: "Each person who is legitimately within the territory of the Russian Federation
shall have the right to move freely and to choose where to live temporarily or permanently."
KONST. RF art. 27.1 (1993), translated in CONSTrrUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra
note 1, app. at 24. Article 35.2 states in full: "Each person shall have the right to own property
and to possess, use and dispose of it both individually and jointly with other persons." Id. art
35.2, app. at 26-27.
26. Decree 5-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 13, Item 1602, at 5983. For a detailed
discussion, see Krylova, supra note 25, at 587-90. Article 34.1 states in full: "Each person shall
have the right to freely use his abilities and property for entrepreneurial or any other economic
activity not prohibited by law." KONST. RF art. 34.1 (1993), translated in CONSTITUTION OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 1, app. at 26.
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theory that provisions affecting parties who have contracted with insolvent
enterprises implicate the freedom of contract. 7
In sum, as a general matter, the Court has given expansive meaning to a
range of Chapter 11 rights.28 In this way, it has extended the coverage of
Article 55.3 to many types of legislative acts.
I.B.
The second question - which forms of governmental action may interfere
with the exercise of constitutional rights? - arises from the reference in
Article 55.3 to federal legislative acts [zakony].29 Does this mean that only
federal zakony have the capacity to interfere with constitutional rights, or that
other forms of governmental action can do so but will not be limited to the
conditions set forth in Article 55.3?"0
The Court's answer to this question has been consistent and clear: the only
form of governmental action that can interfere with the exercise of rights is a
federal zakon (which includes a "code" [kodeks], such as the Code of Criminal
Procedure) or a legislative act of one of the Subjects of the Federation,
enacted in strict conformity with an act of delegation by the Federal
Assembly.3 The Court established this interpretation in the first case
involving application of Article 55.3. In that case, a federal act (Article 54.1
of the RSFSR Housing Code) was at issue, but the Court found the provision
invalid because it did not specify the type of normative act required for an
"established procedure" for resolving housing disputes.32 Because of this
ambiguity, the Court ruled that Article 54.1 failed to satisfy the Article 55.3
27. Decree 10-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 29, Item 3058, at 5984-85.
28. These include, among others, rights to judicial protection under Article 46 and rights
of participants in the criminal process, including suspects, accused persons, defendants, and
victims of crime, in Articles 47-52. A full discussion of the Court's jurisdiction on these
questions is beyond the scope of this Essay.
29. KONST. RF art. 55.3 (1993), translated in CONSTrrUTIONOFTHERUSSIAN FEDERATION,
supra note 1, app. at 33; see also discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of related issues, see DANILENKO& BURNHAM, supra note 15, at 233-
35.
31. Decrees in which the Court has applied Article 55.3 to legislative acts of the Subjects
include: (1) Decree 12-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 18, Item 2063; (2) Decree 19-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 51, Item 5877; and (3) Decree 9-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 16,
Item 1909. I have benefitted greatly from William Burnham's insights on the matter of
Subjects' legislative acts.
32. Decree 3-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 18, Item 1708, at 3118; see also Decree 12-
P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 18, Item 2063, at 3943.
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requirement that constitutional rights be restricted only pursuant to a statute
[zakon].3
This construction of Article 55.3 is potentially very important in defining
the scope of the Court's review because in certain sections of Article 125 the
Court is competent to review a range of generally applicable governmental
acts ("normative acts") that is broader than that permitted under Article
125.4.' Another approach to Article 55.3 might have freed these normative
acts from the Article 55.3 restrictions and deprived the Court of a significant
component of its review powers. As I indicated, this is only potentially
important because the Court has, to my knowledge, only applied Article 55.3
to executive branch normative acts in one significant case - the 1995
Chechnia decision.35 In that case, the zakon requirement in Article 55.3 was
central to a number of the Court's determinations as to which presidential
edicts were valid because of their grounding in a federal zakon, and those
which were not because the legislature did not specifically authorize them.36
II. C.
Over the course of its existence, the Court has devoted its most extensive
Article 55.3 analysis to the third question posed above: does the legislative act
in question advance a public interest that the constitution identifies as
legitimate for interference with constitutional rights? In these cases, the Court
has adhered to two fundamental propositions: (1) that the Article 55.3 list of
legitimate interests is exhaustive; and (2) that the interests identified in the list
are to be construed narrowly. These have been evidenced in Court decrees
that follow two different approaches.
33. Decree 3-P, Sobr. Zakanod. RF, 1995, No. 18, Item 1708, at 3118-19. Later decisions
upholding and/or expressly applying this construction of Article 55.3 include: (1) Decree 4-P,
Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 10, Item 1254 (Russian Federation Law "On Banks and Banking
Activity"); (2) Decree 6-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 9, Item 1142 (USSR Law "On the
Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the USSR"); (3) Decree 16-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No.
46, Item 5339 (Russian Federation Law "On State Borders"); and (4) Decree 1O-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 33, Item 35 (Presidential Edicts regarding the Chechen Republic).
34. Regarding the Article 125.4 limits on the Court's review when entertaining individual
complaints or court referrals, see supra note 15 and accompanying text. "Normative acts"
include not only legislative acts of the Federal Assembly (zakony) but also generally applicable
acts of the president (both edicts (ukazy) and regulations (rasporiazhennia)) and government
(decrees (postanovleniia)). For a discussion of the jurisdictional issues associated with the
classification of "normative acts" in Article 125, see Krug, Centralized Model, supra note 15,
at 743-45.
35. Decree 10-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 33, Item 3424.
36. Id.
[Vol. 56:677
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II.C.1.
The first of these approaches is a case-by-case assessment of legitimacy,
focusing on the specific governmental act and the Court's conclusion as to the
goal that the act seeks to achieve. In applying this approach, the Court's style
of presentation in its decrees has been somewhat inconsistent. In some cases,
the Court has failed to clearly identify either the precise interest at stake or the
Court's reasons for finding it either legitimate or illegitimate.
On the other hand, in those cases (increasing in number) where the Court's
discussion has been more focused, the Court's first step in assessing
legitimacy has been to identify the relevant interest.3" As a result, these
decrees often are marked by a detailed textual analysis in which the Court has
spent little time attempting to divine legislative intent.39 Instead, the Court has
concentrated on identifying the apparent interest advanced by the particular
provision on the basis of its text, its place in a larger legislative act, and that
act's relationship to other acts in the overall statutory scheme.
In some fifteen decrees, the Court has directly stated that either the interest
was legitimate or was not legitimate. In these decrees, the Court has found
legislative interests legitimate on eight occasions' and not legitimate on
nine.4 In two decrees the Court found at least one interest legitimate and at
37. See, e.g., Decree 7-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 24, Item 2342, at 4458. Note,
however, that this was one of the Court's first decrees applying Article 55.3. In a later example,
the Court clearly stated that a legislative restriction on the right to social security (Article 39.1
of the constitution) did not advance a legitimate interest, but did not articulate its reasons for
this conclusion. Decree 18-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 25, Item 3003, at 5476. In
contrast, see the clear statement from Judge Kononov in a separate opinion in a later case
involving the Customs Code, in which he stated that economic policy is not one of the
constitutionally recognized goals found in Article 55.3. Decree 7-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001,
No. 23, Item 2409. Perhaps a similar view formed the basis for the Court's holding in Decree
18-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 25, Item 3003.
38. See, for example, Decree 17-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 1, Item 54, which
identified state security as the relevant interest. Id. at 275-76; see also decrees cited infra note
40.
39. See decrees cited infra note 40.
40. Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 31, Item 3160; Decree 13-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 32, Item 3412; Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 21, Item
2258; Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 12, Item 1458; Decree 4-P, Sobr. Zakonod.
RF 1998, No. 6, Item 783; Decree 16-P. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 46, Item 5339; Decree
17-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 1, Item 54; Decree 7-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 24,
Item 2342. There are also a number of Article 55.3 cases in which the Court implicitly accepted
the interest as legitimate and proceeded to the next step in the analysis: strict proportionality,
which is discussed infra Part ll.D.
41. Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 32, Item 3412; Decree 11-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Item 2882; Decree 7-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 19, Item
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least one not legitimate.42 In those cases in which the Court expressly found
a clearly identified interest legitimate, the interest usually has been protecting
the rights and legal interests of others. An example is the Court's determin-
ation that legislative provisions providing for judicial supervisory review
[nadzor] of lower court sentences in criminal cases advance the "rights and
legal interests of other persons," including the victims of crime.43 In another
case, the Court found that a Bankruptcy Code provision permitting the transfer
of property from the bankruptcy estate to a municipality advanced the
protection of the rights and legal interests of others (thus, including a
municipality within the definition of "others").44
One of the clearest examples of the Court's determination that an interest
was not legitimate came in the well-known Smirnov case.45 In this decree, the
Court for the first time stated that the Article 55.3 limitations on the exercise
of constitutional rights cannot be interpreted broadly.46 The Court held that
none of the Article 55.3 enumerated interests, including state security, could
be used to justify the imposition of criminal penalties for the basic act of
leaving the homeland and refusing to return. 47 At the same time the Court
ruled that the criminalization of furnishing assistance to foreign states - such
as in the transfer of state secrets - while abroad was justified under the state
security interest.
48
11.C.2.
The Court has been more sweeping in its second approach to determining
the legitimacy of limiting constitutional rights, identifying certain rights that
are categorically insulated from governmental interference. As a result, no
public interest that serves to support restrictions on these rights is legitimate
for purposes of Article 55.3. Thus, in at least nine cases, the Court has ruled
that certain constitutional rights, such as the Article 46 right to judicial
2102; Decree 4-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 10, Item 1254; Decree 18-P, Sobr. Zakonod.
RF, 1998, No. 25, Item 3003; Decree 19-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 51, Item 5877;
Decree 17-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 1, Item 54; Decree I-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996,
No. 4, Item 408; Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 27, Item 2622.
42. Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 32, Item 3412; Decree 17-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 1, Item 54.
43. Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 31, Item 3160, at 8097-98.
44. Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 21, Item 2258, at 4523. Because the Court
here construed "others" in Article 55.3 to encompass not natural persons, but a municipality,
this is a broad interpretation of that term.
45. Decree 17-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 1, Item 54.
46. Id. at 276.
47. Id. at 275-76.
48. Id. at 276-77.
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protection of rights and freedoms,49 and the Article 48 right to qualified legal
501assistance, ° belong in this category.5' On a more limited basis, the Court has
held that the placement of any monetary conditions on the exercise of the right
of freedom of movement in Article 27 is also invalid.52 On the other hand, in
a number of cases, the Court has expressly stated that certain chapter II rights
are not absolute and are therefore subject to restrictions consistent with
Article 55.3.53
This categorical approach is grounded in two propositions. First, as to
Article 46, the Court has stated that this degree of insulation is necessary
because access to judicial protection is essential for effective realization of all
other chapter H rights.54 Second, the Court has given a broad reading to
another constitutional provision: Article 56.3." According to the Court,
49. Examples include: (1) Decree 1O-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 29, Item 3058
(invalidating limits on the rights of bank depositors whose accounts were subject to the laws on
restructuring and insolvency of credit organizations); and (2) Decree 4-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF,
2001, No. 12, Item 1138 (invalidating provisions of the 1998 Law on Bankruptcy that limited
the opportunity to appeal certain categories of economic (Arbitrazh) court decisions). The
Court first employed this approach in the second of its Article 55.3 cases, in which the Court
invalidated criminal procedure code provisions that denied judicial review of arrest warrants to
persons who were not actually held in detention. Decree 4-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No.
19, Item 1764, at 3406.
50. Decree 1 1-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Item 2882 (invalidating RSFSR
criminal procedure code provisions that denied defense counsel the opportunity to participate
fully in criminal proceedings in which a client was interrogated as a witness but not yet named
as an accused).
51. See the remarks of Judge Kononov in Prava cheloveka v Rossii: deklaratsii, nonny i
zhizn' (materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii, posviashchennoi 50-letiiu vseobshchei
deklaratsii pray cheloveka), 3 GoSUDARsTvoI PRAVo [Gos. I PRAvO] 37, 44-45 (2000).
52. Decree 9-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 16, Item 1909, at 4201.
53. In particular, the Court has reiterated this point in regard to the property rights in Article
35 of the constitution. See, e.g., Decree 20-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 1, Item 197.
Another right that the Court has not found to be absolute is the Article 27.1 right of freedom of
movement. See Decree 4-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 6, Item 783 (citing as an example
prohibitions on access to military zones).
54. Decree 10-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 29, Item 3058, at 5985; Decree 4-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 12, Item 1138, at 2837.
55. Article 56.3 states in full: "The rights and freedoms specified in Articles 20, 21, 23
(Part 1), 24, 28, 34 (Part 1), 40 (Part 1), and 46-54 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation
shall not be subject to restriction." KONST. RF art. 56.3 (1993), translated in CONSTIruTION
OF THE RussIAN FEDERATION, supra note 1, app. at 34. These Articles guarantee: the right to
life (Article 20); right of individual dignity and freedom from torture, violence, or other cruel
or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 21); rights of privacy and protection of honor and
reputation (Article 23.1); rights as to personal data collection and use (Article 24); freedom of
conscience and religion (Article 28); right of abilities and property for business activity (Article
34.1); right to housing (Art. 40.1); rights of judicial protection (Articles 46 and 47.1); right to
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Article 55.3 incorporates Articles 56.3's prohibitions, thereby shielding the
enumerated constitutional rights from state interference.56 The Court might
have employed a different textual construction: that Article 56.3 should be
read in conjunction with the first two paragraphs of that Article, which
expressly relate only to "states of emergency."57 Under Article 88 of the
constitution, states of emergency can be declared only by the President of the
Federation, acting in accordance with a federal constitutional law.58 Thus, it
is possible that Article 56.3 might have been construed narrowly to apply only
in such circumstances.
II.D.
The Court's treatment of the fourth question - the meaning of "necessary"
in Article 55.3 - has emerged as the most dynamic aspect of the Court's
jurisprudence under Article 55.3 and the one that perhaps has the most
significant long-term implications. In some of its early decisions, the Court
suggested that "necessary" has an independent significance that requires the
Court, even in cases where the legislative goal is deemed legitimate, to
proceed further to determine whether the means employed are consistent with
that purpose.59 Since that time, the Court's case law in this area has reflected
an effort to develop an appropriate and consistently applicable formulation of
a strict proportionality test.'
Before examining this development, I should make several preliminary
observations. First, the emergence and evolution of the Court's strict
proportionality test is linked to the Court's articulation of a set of "general
a jury in criminal proceedings (Article 47.2); rights of detainees and criminal defendants
(Articles 48.2 and 49-50); right against self-incrimination (Article 51); rights of crime victims
(Article 52); right to compensation by the state for harm inflicted by illegal acts of state
authority (Article 53); and prohibition of application of ex post facto laws (Article 54).
56. See, e.g., Determination 261-0, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 7, Item 742, at 2267;
Decree 1 1-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Item 2882, at 5500-01; Decree 13-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 19, Item 2142, at 4078; Decree 4-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 19,
Item 1764, at 3406. Contra Decree 20-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 1, Item 197, at 283
(rights of private ownership in Article 35 are not among those enumerated in Article 56.3, and
therefore are not absolute).
57. KONST. RF art. 56.1-.2 (1993), translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, supra note 1, app. at 33-34.
58. Article 88 states in relevant part: "The President of the Russian Federation shall, under
the circumstances and in accordance with the procedures stipulated by federal constitutional
law, announce a state of emergency within the territory of the Russian Federation .... " Id. art.
88, app. at 51.
59. See, e.g., Decree 1-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 4, Item 408, at 1087.
60. See discussion infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
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principles of law" (also referred to as "constitutional principles") that are said
to be inherent in Article 55.3.61 These principles, or implied constitutional
protections, include "proportionality" (usually sorazmernost', at times
proportsional'nost )62 and "fairness" (spravedlivost ),63 as well as two other
general principles that are linked to the proportionality analysis: "legal
security" (pravovaia bezopasnost') and "legal certainty" (pravovaia
stabil'nost').4  The inclusion of general principles in the Court's
jurisprudence is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it is a departure from
strictly literal interpretive methodology. Second, it appears to borrow from
the well-established use of "general principles of law" by courts such as the
European Court of Justice and German Federal Constitutional Court, both of
which apply fundamental texts that do not refer to the concept and which have
entrenched proportionality among the implied protections of individual
rights.
65
61. The First Constitutional Court also spoke of general principles of law, most often citing
the principle of separation of powers in cases related to allocation of governmental authority
under the pre-1993 constitution. See, e.g., Decree 6-P, VEDOMOSTI S"EZDA NARODNYKH
DEPUTATOV ROSSIISKOIFEDERATSII IVERKHOVNOGOSOVETARosSIISKoI FEDERATSII, 1993, No.
17, Item 621, at 1037; Decree 9-P, VEDOMOSTI S"EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATS1I I VERKHOVNOCK) SOVETA RossIISKoI FEDERATSn, 1993, No. 11, Item 400, at 659.
Several decrees, dealing with other constitutional issues, also identified other general principles,
including "equality," Decree 8-P, VEDOMOSTI S"EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROssIisKOI FEDERATSII, 1992, No. 30, Item 1809, at 2271,
a rule against retroactive application of legal acts, Decree 9-P. VEDOMOSTI S"EZDA NARODNYKH
DEPUTATOV RossusKoI FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII, 1993, No.
11, Item 400, at 660, and "fairness," Decree I-P, VEDOMOSTI S"EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV
RossUSKOI FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RossIIsKOI FEDERATSII, 1993, No. 14, Item
508, at 825. See also a brief discussion of "general principles," stating that the constitutional
text did not refer to the concept, in Decree 6-P, VEDOMOSTI S"EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV
RossIISKoI FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RossISKOi FEDERATSH, 1993, No. 17, Item
621, at 1042. I have found no citation of a principle of "proportionality" in any of the First
Constitutional Court's Decrees - a circumstance that might be explained in part by the absence
of a textual proportionality principle in the pre-1993 constitution.
62. Ger van den Berg prefers the English translation, to be "commensurate with." See Ger
P. van den Berg, supra note 17, at 181. However, in light of the Court's analysis in recent cases
and the similarity of the Court's approach to what is uniformly called the "proportionality" test
of the European Court of Justice and other courts, I have decided to use the term
"proportionality."
63. Examples are Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 31, Item 3160, and Decree
10-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 29, Item 3058. See also Decree 10-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF,
2002, No. 25, Item 2515 (citing only "proportionality," and not "fairness").
64. Decree 13-P. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 31, Item 3160, at 8095, 8097.
65. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 46; George A. Bernann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 386 (1994); Kirk, supra note 9, at 8 (including also European Court
of Human Rights and French Conseil d' Etat); de Burca, supra note 10, at 114-15.
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As to the Court's case law, it is evident that most members of the Court
have embraced, or at least accepted, the strict proportionality methodology,
with all of its implications for exacting judicial review of legislative action.66
Among the judges who, either by their role as reporters (dokladchiki) or in
separate opinions, have evidenced particular interest in on-going refinement
of this methodology are Judges Gadzhiev, Kononov, and Zor'kin.67 The only
judge who expressly has voiced rejection of this approach is Judge Vitruk,
who in a number of separate opinions has counseled greater judicial restraint
and deference to the legislative branch.68
Two decisions involving the law on bankruptcy illustrate the Court's
application of proportionality analysis. In the first, the Court found that a
provision permitting the transfer of property from the bankruptcy estate to a
municipality was a disproportionate interference with the property rights of
the debtor because it failed to provide compensation.69 In the second, the
Court examined a legislative grant of power to a bankruptcy trustee to cancel
a long-term contract with a creditor.70 The Court ruled that this constituted an
interference with freedom of contract grounded in arbitrary criteria that were
not "necessary" to meet the legitimate goal of protecting the rights of others.7"
In both cases, the Court emphasized that the proportionality test requires
that legislation strike a fair balance between competing interests.72 Thus, in
66. Regarding "strict proportionality" and "broad proportionality," see discussion supra
note 10 and accompanying text. The first decision in which the Court expressly identified
necessity as a discrete requirement in proportionality analysis and fully articulated its
components, was Decree 14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 26, Item 3185, at 6554-55. Other
cases in which the Court has applied proportionality include: Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF,
2002, No. 31, Item 3160 (aspects of judicial supervisory review under the RSFSR Code of
Criminal Procedure); Decree 10-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 25, Item 2515 (provisions
of election law); Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 32, Item 3412; Decree 7-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 23, Item 2409; Decree 14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 49, Item
4861 (media subsidy case); Decree 11 -P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 30, Item 3988; Decree
14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 20, Item 2173; Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No.
12, Item 1458; and Decree 14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 26, Item 3185.
67. For example, Judge Gadzhiev was the Reporter in Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF,
2000, No. 21, Item 2258. Regarding Judge Kononov, see supra note 37 and accompanying text,
and Decree 11-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Item 2882, at 5502. Judge Zor'kin has
been particularly active in this regard. See, e.g., Decree 9-P. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 24,
Item 2658, at 5103; Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 21, Item 2669, at 4921-22;
Decree 14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 20, Item 2173, at 4219.
68. See, e.g., Decree 9-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 23, Item 2890, at 5275; Decree
12-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 18, Item 2063, at 3950-5 1.
69. Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 21, Item 2258, at 4523-25.
70. Decree 9-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 24, Item 2658.
71. Id. at 5103.
72. Id.; Decree 8-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 21, Item 2258, at 4523-25.
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contrast to the categorical approach used in the Court's assessment of the
legitimacy of legislative goals, in proportionality analysis the Court has
introduced a balancing test that requires an assessment of the relative values
of the legitimate interest and the implicated constitutional right.
Identification of the elements of the Court's strict proportionality test must
acknowledge the fact that application of the test in the practice of other courts
follows two lines of inquiry. They are to a considerable extent separable, so
that a court may pursue one without necessarily employing the other. One of
these requires that the interference not be overly intrusive. In other words, it
seeks to determine whether the legislature has imposed an excessive burden
on the exercise of a constitutional right.73 This approach - the "excessive
burden" test - is directed primarily toward protection of individual rights.
The other approach requires that the interference be the least intrusive
measure capable of advancing the legitimate goal. This "least intrusive
alternative" test can be a formidable tool for broad evaluation of the
legislature's policy choices.74 The European Court of Justice and German
Federal Constitutional Court have long employed it to reject legislative
choices by finding that other, less intrusive policies were available to advance
constitutionally legitimate goals.75
The Russian Federation Constitutional Court has not embarked on this
latter path in any concerted fashion. In general, its strict proportionality
analysis has focused on the protection of individual rights by an application
of the "excessive burden" test.7 6 However, several of the Court's decrees have
contained hints of a more broad-scale policy evaluation,7 7 and it is evident that
73. Thus, in Decree 14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 26, Item 3185, the Court stated
that the principle of proportionality expressed in Article 55.3 requires that "[t]he state can not
employ excessive means, but only those that are necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve its
goals." Id. at 6554.
74. de Burca, supra note 10, at 106-07; Engel, supra note 10, at 3, 10.
75. See, for example, the judgments of the European Court of Justice in Case 178/84,
Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 ECR 1227,128, 51 C.M.L.R. 780, 806 (1988), and Case
C-241/89, Societe d'application et de recherches en pharmacologie et phytotherapie SARL v.
Chambre syndicale des raffineurs et conditionneurs de sucre de France, 1990 ECR 1-4695, 1
31 (both reciting that "[i]f a Member State has a choice between various measures to attain the
same objective it should choose the means which least restricts" the free movement of goods).
For a summary of the case law and commentary with regard to Germany, see Kommers, supra
note 10, at 46, Kirk, supra note 9, at 7, and Engel, supra note 10, at 2-3.
76. A number of the decrees have involved the Court's invalidation of legislative provisions
establishing criminal or administrative sanctions that the Court found excessive. E.g., Decree
7-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 23, Item 2409; Decree I-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No.
30, Item 3988; Decree 14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 20, Item 2173; Decree 8-P, Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 12, Item 1458.
77. See, e.g., Decree 13-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 32, Item 3412; Decree 9-P, Sobr.
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the Court has developed a basis for engaging more fully in this exercise if it
wishes to do so.78
I11. Possible Implications: Constitutional Methodology
and the "Broader Questions"
These considerations lead to the second goal of my Essay: speculation as
to the implications of these developments for the evolution of Russia's
constitutional order. In this regard, it should be noted that the Russian
Federation Constitutional Court's active application of proportionality
methodologies serves as an example of the Court's participation in the
perceived trend toward globalization in judicial systems.7 9 It perhaps was to
be expected that members of the Court would examine various judicial
methodologies following the intense interest in foreign constitutional models
in the early 1990s.80 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in a relatively short
time period most members of the Court have agreed to the Court's consistent
application of these models. There was little, if anything, in the Russian
constitutional or administrative law traditions to draw upon in approaching the
questions associated with broad proportionality methodologies. As such, the
Court's rapid development of its methodology must be attributed in part to the
proclivity of its members to borrow from the influential European courts,
while at the same time giving them meaning in the Russian constitutional
context.
The implications of the Court's relatively quiet but growing assertiveness
in this area, particularly as reflected in its adoption and application of the
proportionality principle, could be significant. First, it has established the
framework for the Court's scrutiny of legislation in highly visible cases. For
example, in the aftermath of the theater hostage crisis in Moscow, the Federal
Assembly in November 2002 adopted amendments to the 1991 Law on the
Mass Media. The amendments, which were intensely criticized as excessively
broad in scope and subsequently were vetoed by President Putin, prohibited
the mass media from reporting any information seen as obstructing anti-
Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 21, Item 2258.
78. Judge Kononov, for example, has signaled that he is prepared to embark on such an
approach. In his separate opinion in Decree 7-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 23, Item 2409,
he argued that a lack of normative precision is absolutely impermissible under Article 55.3.
79. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103
(2000).
80. As Robert Sharlet has noted, "Chapter 2 of the 1993 Constitution was written to reflect
European and international human rights standards .... " Robert Sharlet, Putin and the Politics
of Law in Russia, 17 POST-SOvIET AFFAIRS 195, 196 (2001) [hereinafter Sharlet, Putin].
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terrorist operations." Had President Putin not vetoed the amendments, they
could have been fertile ground for application of strict proportionality. They
undoubtedly advanced legitimate Article 55.3 interests, but were they
sufficiently tailored to satisfy an "excessive burden" test, or even perhaps a
"least intrusive alternative" standard? If the amendments had been subject to
challenge before the Court, would the judges have had the political confidence
to apply the same standards that they have applied in the recent past in less
visible cases?82
Second, the Court's trend suggests that its role might someday expand
beyond focusing on individual rights protection alone and move into policy
evaluation. It is interesting that the strict proportionality analysis, particularly
policy evaluation via the least intrusive alternative test, does not appear to
have elicited concern from the executive or legislative branches.8 3 This sug-
gests that the implications of the Court's evolving proportionality analysis
have not yet been grasped, or else that the Court is not taken seriously enough
to be considered a significant threat to lawmaking.
It is doubtful that these implications will suddenly become dramatically
visible. Instead, the following considerations mitigate against any dramatic
developments in this direction.
First, there are the limits on the Court's competence. Unlike the broad
competence of its continental models such as the European Court of Justice,
European Court of Human Rights, and the German Constitutional Court, the
Court's competence precludes review of non-normative governmental acts."
In addition, the Court's competence does not include examination of
individual complaints against normative acts, such as Presidential Edicts, that
are not zakony.85 One of the consequences of the Court's limited competence
might be an unfortunate perception that the Court's docket is limited to
81. Eric Engleman, Putin Vetoes Media Reporting Legislation, Associated Press, Nov. 25,
2002.
82. Meanwhile, review of this question could extend to the European Court of Human
Rights, which has developed extensive jurisprudence on national security concerns and the
exercise of free expression rights under Article 10 of the ECHR. See, e.g., Ceylan v. Turkey,
1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 27; Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, 306 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1995); Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs and Gubi v. Austria, 302
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1991); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991). The
judgements of the European Court of Human Rights are available at the court's website,
http://www.echr.coe.int.
83. For President Putin's views on the Court, see Sharlet, Putin, supra note 80.
84. See discussion supra notes 15, 34 and accompanying text.
85. See discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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matters of little significance. This impression is undoubtedly incorrect,
however, especially from a long-term perspective. 6
Second, in regard to the "excessive burden" approach and protection of
individual rights, the Court has been reluctant to delve into one of the most
challenging applications of the proportionality principle - its application in
cases that involve the direct-clash of countervailing constitutional rights. In
a case involving state subsidies to the mass media, for example, the Court
largely ignored the problem, analyzing the challenged legislation almost
entirely from the perspective of its impact on the exercise of property rights. 7
Though the Court found the legislation invalid, it failed to balance the free
expression rights that also were at issue.88
Finally, as to both the "excessive burden" and "least intrusive alternative"
tests, the Court is undoubtedly aware of its uncertain legitimacy and authority
in the Russian polity.89 With the exception of the 1995 Chechnia decision,
which was not really an individual rights case, the Court has not yet applied
Article 55.3 in a high-profile, politically charged setting. We can expect the
Court to maintain its relatively low profile while continuing to build patiently
a methodological and doctrinal foundation for the future.
These considerations lead to the question of the Court's long-term status in
Russia's constitutional order. Although the subtleties of the Court's Article
55.3 jurisprudence can hardly be considered directly relevant to problems such
as immediate enforcement by Russian officials, the Court's respect for and
reasoned approach to accommodation methodologies (those that seek to
reconcile the exercise of constitutional rights and conflicting governmental
interests) might have a significant impact in the long term. The identification
of criteria and methodologies for practical application of the accommodation
problem is essential for the development and maintenance of a constitutional
consciousness - what Robert Sharlet has identified as a recognition of the
"intrinsic value" of law.9° The reason for this is that by affording a means of
86. See Peter B. Maggs, Constitutional Commercial Law in the Courts, Paper Presented at
Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Nov.
24, 2002) (on file with author).
87. Decree 14-P, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 49, Item 4861.
88. Id. For commentary, see Peter Krug, Glasnost' as a Constitutional Norm: The Article
29 Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and Other Courts in the Russian Federation, Paper
Presented at Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic
Studies (Nov. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
89. For a comprehensive examination of this question, see Alexei Trochev, The
Constitutional Court Has Ruled... What's Next?, Paper Presented at Annual Convention of
the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Nov. 24,2002) (on file with
author).
90. Sharlet, Putin, supra note 80, at 196; see also Engel, supra note 10, at 2 (noting the
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recognition for both legitimate governmental action and the exercise of
fundamental rights, the accommodation problem addresses the concerns of
both political elites in the executive and legislative branches and the public,
creating a means of "reciprocity" between the state and its citizenry.9 It is
through the careful, ongoing development of a reasoned methodology for
resolving the tensions inherent in the exercise of governmental action within
a structure of individual constitutional rights that a judicial body, such as the
Court, can gradually enhance its legitimacy.
In this regard, the acquisition of greater legitimacy among political elites
and the general public could have its most important impact within the
judiciary - specifically impacting the Court's challenging and often stormy
relationship with the courts of general jurisdiction,92 perhaps influencing their
substantive decisionmaking. This matter is of particular importance because
of the allocation of competencies assigning constitutional application to the
courts of general jurisdiction in cases involving the vast range of non-
normative governmental acts. While my research on this question definitely
requires updating, earlier decisions of bodies such as the Russian Federation
Supreme Court have demonstrated either an apparent lack of familiarity with
proportionality methodologies or a disinclination to apply them.93 There is
nothing in the allocation of competencies that should preclude the courts of
general jurisdiction from applying Article 55.3 and its principles to non-
normative acts. If these courts were to begin adopting the Constitutional
Court's methodology - particularly the balancing associated with
proportionality analysis - it would mark a significant step in the creation of
a more common constitutional "space" among the various sectors of the
judiciary.
IV. Conclusion
In a relatively short period of time, the Russian Federation Constitutional
Court has developed a methodology for effectuating the accommodation
principle. Certainly, this is a work in progress for the Court, and it faces the
post-World War I German public's "almost naive belief in the beneficial abilities of law").
91. See KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER 3 (1996) (law valued by both
political elites and citizenry).
92. For a recent study, see Trochev, supra note 89. See also PETER H. SOLOMON, JR. &
TODD S. FOGLESONG, COURTS AND TRANSITION IN RUSSIA: THE CHALENGE OFJUDICIALREFoRM
76-78 (2000); Peter Krug, The Russian Federation Supreme Court and Constitutional Practice
in the Courts of General Jurisdiction: Recent Developments, 26 REV. CENT. & E. EUROPEAN
L. 129, 133-34 (2000) [hereinafter Krug, Recent Developments]; Krug, Centralized Model,
supra note 15, at 747-50.
93. Krug, Recent Developments, supra note 92, at 141-42.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
challenges I have identified. However, in the end, patient development of
methodologies and judicial style such as those associated with Article 55.3
can be of significant help in making constitutional law "matter" in Russia.94
Therefore, this aspect of the Court's practice bears watching. Quietly, the
Court is developing the tools for a more pronounced role in Russia's
constitutional order. Whether it will choose at some point to activate these
tools in an aggressive fashion, and how Russia's executive and legislative
branches will respond, should furnish an informative perspective from which
to view Russia's constitutional development.
94. See HENDLEY, supra note 91.
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